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inﬂation oﬀsets some of the wage gains. The main policy implication deriving from
these results is that the potential of the minimum wage to help the poor is bigger
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The minimum wage helps the poor if it increases wages and does not destroy jobs or cause
inﬂation. It is well established in the literature that minimum wage increases compress the
wage distribution (Brown, 1999). As a result, the policy debate hinges on whether employers
respond to the associated higher labor costs by reducing proﬁts, reducing employment, or
raising prices. Firstly, the empirical evidence on the proﬁte ﬀects is very limited, but stan-
dard theory suggests that low wage ﬁrms operate in competitive markets with zero proﬁts
(Card and Krueger, 1995). Therefore, changes in proﬁts are hard to detect. Secondly, evi-
dence of negative employment eﬀects, predicted by the standard theoretical model, conﬂicts
with evidence of non-negative eﬀects in the literature. Although there is yet no consen-
sus, small employment eﬀects have been frequently reported (Freeman, 1996; Brown, 1999;
Dickens et al, 1999). Thirdly, with employment and proﬁts not signiﬁcantly aﬀected, higher
prices are the obvious alternative response to minimum wage increases. This is consistent
with the standard theory prediction that an industry wide cost shock is passed on to prices.
Nonetheless, there is very little empirical evidence on price eﬀects in the literature (Brown,
1999; Lemos, 2004a).
The main contribution of this paper is to present new evidence on all three of these
minimum wage eﬀects together. By examining wages, employment and price eﬀects together,
we are able to provide an explanation for the small employment eﬀects prevalent in the
literature. This has potentially important policy implications, and yet empirical analysis
has been unable to shed suﬃcient light at it. The price eﬀect evidence we provided is, in
turn, another contribution of this paper to a very under researched area.
A further contribution of this paper is to provide evidence on what Brown (1999, p.
2157), in his recent comprehensive survey, reckons is “the largest and most important gap
in the minimum wage literature”. We estimate anticipated and lagged wages, employment
and price responses to minimum wage increases. This is another aspect of minimum wage
eﬀects that has important policy implications, as we demonstrate in this paper.
The data used is monthly Brazilian household and ﬁrm panel data from 1982 to 2000. As
the non-US literature is relatively scarce, an additional contribution of this paper is to extend
the current understanding on the eﬀects of the minimum wage in developing countries. The
limited available empirical evidence for Brazil suggests that the minimum wage compresses
the wage distribution and has a small adverse employment eﬀect (Fajnzylber, 2001; Carneiro,
2002; Neumark, Cunningham and Siga, 2005).
2Our principal ﬁnding is that increasing the minimum wage raises wages and prices with
small adverse employment eﬀects in Brazil. This suggests a general wage-price inﬂationary
spiral, where persistent inﬂation oﬀsets some of the wage gains. Minimum wage indexation
and reinforced inﬂationary expectations were a phenomenon ﬁrst noticed by Gramlich (1976)
and Cox and Oaxaca (1981), and more recently discussed by Card and Krueger (1995)
and Freeman (1996). If this is the context, it is perhaps not so surprising that adverse
employment eﬀects are small. The main policy implication deriving from these results is
that the potential of the minimum wage to help the poor is bigger under low inﬂation.
Under high inﬂation, the resulting wage-price spiral makes the minimum wage increase —
as well as its antipoverty policy potential — short lived. In this case, the wage eﬀects are
volatile and the permanent scars are lower employment and higher inﬂation.
Another important ﬁnding is that the poorest only beneﬁt from higher wages in the
month of the minimum wage increase. However, they start suﬀering from higher unemploy-
ment and inﬂation one month before. Furthermore, they are faced with higher inﬂation for
the following three months, by which time some of their wages gains are oﬀset. Under this
scenario, a better antipoverty policy is perhaps to lower inﬂation. A stable growing economy
will aid the poor perhaps more than quickly eroded minimum wage increases. Other options
include structural reforms and direct cash transfers (Harrison, Rutherford, Tarr and Gurgel,
2004; Jayaraman and Lanjouw, 2004; Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite, 2003). The remain-
der of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional background of
the minimum wage in Brazil. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical
equations and identiﬁcation issues. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Minimum Wage Institutional Background
The minimum wage was introduced as a social policy in Brazil under the 1940’s populist
government. After a steep decline during the 1940s, the real minimum wage was adjusted
and reached its peak during the boom of the 1950s. It then decreased as a result of the
subsequent recession. With the installation of the dictatorship in the mid 1960s, the real
minimum wage was systematically devalued because the government associated the then
high inﬂation with wage adjustments. Even after the end of the military regime in the mid
1980s, the minimum wage continued to be used as an anti-inﬂationary policy throughout
the 1980s and most of the 1990s. During this time, minimum wage increases were subject
to the rules of ﬁve diﬀerent stabilization plans. The increases were large and frequent, but
3were quickly eroded by the subsequent inﬂation. Since the mid 1990s, under reasonably
stable inﬂation, the minimum wage has again been used as a social policy. Since 1984,
the minimum wage in Brazil has been the same for all individuals. There have been no
diﬀerentiated minimum wage rates for diﬀerent regions, speciﬁc demographic groups or
labor market categories. Coverage is full, although accommodation and food costs can be
deducted from the wage.
3D a t a
The data we use is the PME (Monthly Employment Survey), the PIM (Monthly Industrial
Survey), the Consumers Price index, and the minimum wage. All data is available from the
IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de GeograﬁaeE s t a t i s t i c a ) .
The PME is a rotating household panel, similar to the US Current Population Survey,
which has been collected since 1982. The IBGE interviews on average 30.000 households per
month in the six main Brazilian metropolitan regions (Salvador, Recife, Belo Horizonte, Rio
de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Porto Alegre). Households are interviewed for four consecutive
months, not interviewed for eight months, and then interviewed again for four additional
months, before being dropped from the sample. In the PME the panels are refreshed every
two years, rather than every year, as is the case in the CPS. The PIM is a rotating ﬁrm
panel, similar to the US Production Index, which has been collected since 1968. The IBGE
interviews on average 6.000 ﬁrms per month in most of the Brazilian metropolitan regions
including the six regions above. Firms are assigned a random number when they are ﬁrst
selected for the sample. They are then interviewed monthly for a maximum of four years,
but they may be dropped from the sample before then, depending on the initial random
number assigned. The sample is refreshed once a year.
We aggregate the PME and PIM across regions and months; the average number of
observations per region-month cell is respectively 13,000 and 600. The cross-region variation
in the data is considerable and we exploit this in order to identify the minimum wage eﬀect
in the econometric models below. In Table 1 we show statistics for the poorest region
(Recife) and the richest region (Sao Paulo) in the sample. Wages, prices and employment
are lower in Recife, where the fraction of workers earning the minimum wage is larger. In
Figure 1 we show that the patterns of the log nominal minimum wage and average log wages
in diﬀerences are remarkably synchronized in the aggregate over time, with a correlation of
0.77. In Figure 2 we show that the correlation between the log nominal minimum wage and
4t h ee m p l o y m e n tr a t ei nd i ﬀerences is much weaker, 0.09. Finally, in Figure 3 we show that
the patterns of the log nominal minimum wage and log prices in diﬀerences are also fairly
synchronized, with a correlation of 0.55.
4 Empirical Equation Speciﬁcations
4.1 Wage Eﬀects
A standard empirical wage equation in the literature (Brown, 1999; Dickens, Machin and











where Wrt is nominal average wages in region r and month t, r =1 ,...,6,a n dt =1 ,...,214;
MWt is nominal minimum wage; πrt−1 is past inﬂation; urt−1 is the past unemployment
rate; fw
r and fw
t are region and time ﬁxed eﬀects; Xrt are labor supply shifters; and  w
rt is the
error term. The supply shifters we include are the proportion of the total population who
are younger than 10 years old, between 10 and 24 years of age, women, illiterates, retirees,
students, in urban areas, with completed basic (8 years) education and high school (11 years)
education; the average years of schooling in the total population; the proportion of the
working population holding two jobs, in the informal, public, construction and metallurgy
sectors. We include lags and leads of the minimum wage (indexed by l = −k,...,L)t oa l l o w
the eﬀect of the minimum wage on average wages to be complete. The number of lags and
leads is an empirical matter and is discussed in Section 5. A GLS correction is performed
in all models in the paper to correct for heteroskedasticity arising from aggregation and to
account for the relative importance of each region. Also, standard errors are corrected for
serial correlation across and within regions.1
We re-estimate Equation (1) taking Wrt to mean, in turn, the 10th,2 0 th,3 0 th,4 0 th,5 0 th,
60th,7 0 th,8 0 th and 90th deciles of the wage distribution. This gives an overall picture of the
eﬀect of the minimum wage in the entire wage distribution (Dickens, Machin and Manning,
1999). Because the nominal minimum wage does not vary across regions, we cannot use
1The GLS estimates were robust to GMM estimation using lags of the minimum wage variable as well
as a number of political variables as instruments (Lemos, 2004d). This suggests that any endogeneity bias
arising from the simultaneous determination of “fraction at” and employment is not too severe.
5it as our shock variable. Instead, we use the “fraction of workers at” the minimum wage
(plus or minus 0.02%)2. “Fraction at” replaces the nominal minimum wage in Equations
(1), (2) and (3), as is now standard in the literature (Dolado, Kramarz, Machin, Manning
and Margolis, 1996; Card and Krueger, 1995; Brown, 1999; Lemos, 2004b).
4.2 Employment Eﬀects
The counterpart empirical employment equation (Brown, 1999; Dickens, Machin and Man-
ning, 1999) is:
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t +  n
rt (2)
where Nrt i st a k e ni nt u r nt om e a nt o t a la v e r a g eh o u r sw o r k e di nt h el a b o rf o r c e( i n c l u d e s
zeros for those unemployed) T, average hours for those working (hours per worker) H,
and the employment rate E. As Equation (2) is separately estimated using each of these
dependent variables, the estimates in the T equation equal the sum of the estimates in the






E. This makes it possible to decompose the total
eﬀect of a minimum wage increase on employment into a hours eﬀect and a jobs eﬀect.
4.3 Price Eﬀects
A standard empirical price equation — largely used in the literature on the price response
to industry wide shocks (Poterba, 1996; Goldberg and Knetter, 1997) — is the inverse of the
proﬁt maximizing condition under imperfect competition. This equation expresses prices as
a markup over costs:









t +  
p
rt (3)
where Prt is prices; Eit is the cost of industrial power consumption, and Ait is productivity.
We deﬁne productivity as the total industrial output divided by total number of workers
2The bounds account for measurement error introduced by rounding approximations. All estimates in
the paper were robust to deﬁning “fraction aﬀected” with and without bounds (the correlation between the
two is 0.91).
6directly employed in production in the metallurgic industry.3 The cost of industrial power
consumption is a proxy for costs of inputs other than labor.
5R e s u l t s
In Table 2 we show generalized least squares β estimates. Row 1 shows evidence of antic-
ipated eﬀects of the minimum wage on average wages, but no evidence of lagged eﬀects.
The coeﬃcient of the ﬁrst lead of the shock variable, one month before the increase, is
positive and signiﬁcant. The contemporaneous coeﬃcient is also positive and robust. The
coeﬃcients of further leads and lags are not statistically diﬀerent from zero. This suggests
that on average, wages adjustment in response to minimum wage increases happens in the
month of the increase and in the month before, and that no lagged adjustment follows the
increase. However, the estimate of the minimum wage eﬀect on average wages is a summary
measure of wage eﬀects throughout the wage distribution. A closer look at the estimates
of the minimum wage eﬀect on each decile of the wage distribution reveals a more intricate
picture. For example, while there is evidence of lagged, but not anticipated eﬀects at the
very bottom of the distribution; conversely, there is evidence of anticipated but not lagged
eﬀects at the top half of the distribution. This suggests that the higher paid workers have
greater bargaining power and revise their labor contracts in anticipation of the minimum
wage increase.
Row 2 shows that the contemporaneous coeﬃcient is positive and robust at the 10th
decile of the distribution. It is three times larger than the coeﬃcient for the average wages
(row 1). This suggests that the wages of the poorest increase three times more than average
wages do. However, the coeﬃcient of the second lag of the shock variable, two months after
the increase, is negative and signiﬁcant. It is half the size of the contemporaneous coeﬃcient.
This suggests that after two months, the poorest lose half of the wage gains they had in
the month of the increase. Neumark, Schweitzer and Wascher (2004) also ﬁnd evidence of
strongly negative lagged minimum wage eﬀects for the US. They argue that employers take
advantage of inﬂation in the following periods to partly undo the wage gains resulting from
minimum wage increases. Row 3 shows a similar picture for the 20th decile.
The results for the 30th decile in row 4 show that the contemporaneous coeﬃcient is
positive and signiﬁc a n t .I ti sa b o u ta sl a r g ea st h ec o e ﬃcient for the average wages (row 1).
3Data for all industries was not available, and thus the productivity in the metallurgic industry is taken
as a proxy to overall productivity.
7The coeﬃcient of the ﬁrst lead is positive and signiﬁcant and the coeﬃcient of the second
lag is negative and signiﬁcant. As both are roughly of the same magnitude, whatever those
at the 30th decile gain one month before the increase, they loose two months after the
increase. In the remainder of the distribution, anticipated gains are roughly about the same
magnitude as the eﬀect on average wages (row 1). Further leads and lags are not statistically
diﬀerent from zero. This suggests that most labor contracts — especially those of higher paid
workers — are revised in anticipation of the minimum wage increase.
Concurrently, there is a decrease in total hours worked in the labor force. Row 11 shows a
negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on total hours worked one month before the increase. Further
leads and lags are not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Row 13 shows that the coeﬃcient of
the ﬁrst lead of the employment rate is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. This suggests
that while revising labor contracts in anticipation of the minimum wage increase, employers
and employees negotiate not only wage increases, but also the number of hours worked. It
also suggests that employers do not ﬁre employees at this stage. Instead they ﬁrst increase
prices to oﬀset some of the higher labor costs, as shown by the signiﬁcant and positive
coeﬃcient of prices in row 14. However, in the month of the increase and in the subsequent
month, not only do employers continue to increase prices, but they also start adjusting
employment through ﬁring employees. The coeﬃcient of the employment rate is negative
and signiﬁc a n ti nt h em o n t ho ft h ei n c r e a s ea n dt h ef o l l o w i n gm o n t h ,w h i l et h ec o e ﬃcient of
prices is signiﬁcant and positive for four consecutive months. The price coeﬃcient is about
three quarters of the average wage coeﬃcient (row 1) in the month before and in the month
of the increase. The prices coeﬃcient remains positive and signiﬁcant in the two following
months, even though wage eﬀects become negative and often insigniﬁcant. This suggests
more stickiness in price than in wages following a minimum wage increase. These results
are consistent with those of Aaronson (2001), who included lags and leads of the minimum
wage in his price equation speciﬁcations. He found that in the US most of the price response
occurs in the two months period immediately after a minimum wage increase.
The last column of Table 2 shows long run eﬀects. The wage eﬀects are not statistically
diﬀerent from zero, suggesting no wage gains associated with the minimum wage increase
in the long run. The long run total hours worked eﬀect is signiﬁcant, although month-by-
month this eﬀect is mostly insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The price eﬀect is positive
and signiﬁcant, consistent with month-by-month persistent increases. This suggests that
ﬁrms’ responses to higher labor costs resulting from minimum wage increases is a mix of
8lower employment and higher prices.
In summary, the anticipated wage gains are roughly about the same magnitude through-
out the wage distribution (except for the very poor) one month before the increase. The
price eﬀects are about half the size and there is no evidence of disemployment eﬀects in
that month (although there is some evidence of reduction in hours worked). This suggests
a general wage-price spiral, where nominal variables are aﬀected but not real ones. In the
month of the increase, the poorest beneﬁt relatively more than other workers, as there is no
spillover eﬀects above the 30th percentile. However, the inﬂation eﬀects are now larger and
persistent, and some small disemployment eﬀects start to take place. One month after the
increase, inﬂation persists and some of the wage gains are undone for the poor, with some
further small disemployment eﬀects. Finally, two months after the increase inﬂation starts
to ease, employment eﬀects disappear and those at the bottom half of the distribution have
wage losses. In the long run, the wage eﬀects are volatile and the permanent scars are lower
employment and higher inﬂation.
We calibrate the estimates above to ensure comparability with those in the literature
(Brown, 1999; Card and Krueger, 1995). Following Card and Krueger (1995), the “fraction
at” estimates are multiplied by 0.6, which is the approximate elasticity of the “fraction
at” with respect to the nominal minimum wage (Lemos, 2004c). A 10% increase in the
minimum wage decreases employment by 0.2% and increases prices by 0.8% in the long run.
These results are in line with previous evidence for Brazil, where wage eﬀects are large and
employment eﬀects are small (Fajnzylber, 2001; Carneiro, 2002; Neumark, Cunningham
and Siga, 2005). Our results compare with respectively 1% (mainly in the food industry)
employment decrease and 0.2% to 0.4% economy wide price increases for the US (Brown,
1999; Sellekaerts, 1981; MacCurdy and McIntyre, 2001). Thus, a smaller employment eﬀect
in Brazil is consistent with a larger price eﬀect. However, these are economy wide estimates
that might have diluted more negative employment eﬀects in low wage industries.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper ﬁlls a gap in the literature by providing an overall picture on the eﬀects of
the minimum wage on wages, employment and prices using monthly Brazilian monthly
household and ﬁrm panel between 1982 and 2000. The evidence we provide indicates that
increasing the minimum wage raises wages throughout the wage distribution in the month
before the increase, although it only raises the wages of the poorest in the month of the
9increase. However, persistent inﬂation eﬀects oﬀset some of the wage gains in the following
months. This suggests a general wage-price spiral, where nominal variables are aﬀected but
not real ones. It is then perhaps not so surprising that adverse employment eﬀects are small.
Small employment eﬀects — frequently reported in the recent literature — are sensible when
relatively large price eﬀects are uncovered. In the long run, the wage eﬀects are volatile and
the permanent scars are lower employment and higher inﬂation.
A 10% increase in the minimum wage decreases employment by 0.2% and increases prices
by 0.8% after ﬁve months of adjustment, when wage gains have already vanished. These
results compare with respectively 1% (mainly in the food industry) employment decrease
and 0.2% to 0.4% economy wide price increases for the US. One potential criticism here
is that aggregate estimates might have diluted more negative employment eﬀects in low
wage industries. Estimates for such industries are not available for Brazil. Thus, a fruitful
avenue for future research is to estimate wages, employment and price eﬀects for industries
overpopulated by minimum wage workers in Brazil and other developing countries.
The main policy implication deriving from these results is that the potential of the
minimum wage to help the poor is bigger under low inﬂation. Under high inﬂation, the
resulting wage-price spiral makes the minimum wage increase — as well as its antipoverty
policy potential — short lived. In this case, the wage eﬀects are volatile and the permanent
scars are lower employment and higher inﬂation in Brazil. The poorest only beneﬁtf r o m
higher wages in the month of the minimum wage increase. However, they start suﬀering
from higher unemployment and inﬂation one month before the increase. Furthermore, they
are faced with higher inﬂation for the following three months, by which time some of their
wages gains are oﬀset. Under this scenario, a better antipoverty policy is perhaps to lower
inﬂation. A stable growing economy will aid the poor perhaps more than quickly eroded
minimum wage increases.
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Table 1 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ACROSS REGIONS AND SECTOR
Variables Recife Sao Paulo
(poor region) (rich region)
Average hours worked in the labor force 18.56 34.26
Hours worked per worker 38.61 41.31
Employment rate 44.9% 46.3%
"Fraction (of workers) at" the minimum wage 15.1% 4.0%
Log price index -9.01 -9.13
Log real minimum wage 4.95 5.09
Log 25th percentile real earnings distribution 5.12 5.70
Log 50th percentile real earnings distribution 5.61 6.18
Log 75th percentile real earnings distribution 6.23 6.76
Log average real earnings distribution 5.72 6.26
Log standard deviation real earnings distribution 0.87 0.85
Log price of industrial power consumption 7.93 9.30
Log of average productivity in the metallurgic industry 0.14 0.21
Percentage of Population which is:
Aged 0 to 14 years old 0.18 0.15
Aged 15 to 24 years old 0.27 0.25
Aged 25 to 64 years old 0.47 0.53
Aged over 65 years old 0.07 0.07
Women 0.45 0.43
Students 0.31 0.22
Enrolled in schooling 0.38 0.31
Iiterates 0.86 0.95
Elementary education   (8 years of schooling) 0.43 0.38




Percentage of Workers in the:
Metallurgic industry 0.07 0.19
Building construction 0.03 0.04
Commerce 0.09 0.09
Services 0.26 0.29
Public sector  0.07 0.05
Informal sector 0.23 0.36
Sample size 1507171 3292027  
   14
  
Table 2 - EFFECT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE ON WAGES, EMPLOYMENT AND PRICES
2 months before 1 mont before mont of the increase one month after 2 months after total 
Dependent Variable coefficientstandard error coefficientstandard error coefficientstandard error coefficientstandard error coefficientstandard error coefficientstandard error
average wage 0.02 0.17 0.39 0.18 0.51 0.19 -0.07 0.18 -0.24 0.17 0.59 0.60
10th wage distribution decile -0.42 0.25 0.09 0.25 1.60 0.26 -0.02 0.25 -0.82 0.25 0.43 0.74
20th wage distribution decile -0.38 0.27 0.33 0.27 1.28 0.27 -0.59 0.27 -0.84 0.27 -0.20 0.80
30th wage distribution decile -0.23 0.22 0.47 0.23 0.49 0.23 -0.38 0.23 -0.51 0.23 -0.16 0.69
40th wage distribution decile -0.06 0.19 0.40 0.19 0.26 0.20 -0.13 0.20 -0.48 0.19 -0.02 0.61
50th wage distribution decile -0.04 0.17 0.31 0.18 0.20 0.18 -0.12 0.18 -0.30 0.17 0.04 0.56
60th wage distribution decile 0.15 0.17 0.34 0.18 -0.03 0.18 -0.02 0.18 -0.30 0.17 0.14 0.55
70th wage distribution decile 0.11 0.16 0.39 0.18 0.16 0.18 -0.14 0.18 -0.11 0.17 0.42 0.57
80th wage distribution decile 0.12 0.17 0.42 0.18 -0.10 0.18 -0.02 0.18 -0.21 0.17 0.21 0.56
90th wage distribution decile 0.28 0.17 0.40 0.18 -0.02 0.19 -0.04 0.19 -0.21 0.18 0.42 0.59
total hours worked -0.04 0.05 -0.10 0.05 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.05 -0.07 0.05 -0.26 0.13
hours worked per worker -0.04 0.05 -0.09 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.05 -0.08 0.05 -0.22 0.13
employment rate 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.03
prices 0.10 0.09 0.28 0.12 0.38 0.13 0.32 0.12 0.17 0.09 1.26 0.45
(a) The dependent variable is, in turn, the log of various deciles of the wage distribution, (average) total hours worked for the labour force, hours worked per worker, the employment rate, and logs of prices.  
       The hours worked per worker estimate plus the employment rate estimate add to the total hours worked estimate.
(b) These are the GLS estimates of the shock variable "fraction at" in Equations (1) to (3).  The weights are the square root of the inverse of the sample size. 
      Standard errors are White-corrected and serial correlation corrected across and within regions.   
(c) Labour supply shifters are included as controls in the wages and employment equations, namely, the proportion of the total population younger than 10 years old, between 10 and 24 years of age, women, illiterates, retirees, 
      students, in urban areas, with completed basic and high school education; the average years of schooling in the total population; the proportion of the working population corresponding to workers holding two jobs, 
      workers in the informal, public, construction and metallurgy sectors.  A measure of productivity and a measure of other inputs' prices is included in the price equation.  
(d) To reflect a 10% increase in the minimum wage, the estimates and standard errors need to be multiplied by 0.6, which is the approximate 
      elasticity of the minimum wage with respect to “fraction at”.
w β
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
  





























































Figure 1 - MINIMUM WAGE AND WAGES, BRAZIL 1982-2000
years
 minimum wage  wages

































































Figure 2 - MINIMUM WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT, BRAZIL 1982-2000
years
 minimum wage  employment(x10)




























































Figure 3 - MINIMUM WAGE AND PRICES, BRAZIL 1982-2000
years
 minimum wage  prices
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